Introduction
Semanticists have demonstrated repeatedly over the past twenty years that intonation often conveys information important for determining the content of a discourse. For example, intonation is important for marking focus in English, which in turn is important for interpreting sentences with focus sensitive adverbs like even and only (Beaver and Clark 2003) . Intonation is also important in marking the discourse function of utterances in discourse and dialogue. For example, it is an essential clue in determining whether or not an assertion counts as a felicitous answer to a question given in the prior discourse context. The canonical way of presenting an answer to a question such as (1a) is to place the nuclear pitch accent on the constituent that replaces the wh-particle, as in (1b) (Kadmon 2001 Asher (1995) and Txurruka (1997) investigate the intonational cues to discourse relations in detail within a formal theory of discourse interpretation known as Segmented Discourse Representation Theory or SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003) , and others have investigated the topic in other diverse frameworks (Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 1990 , Roberts 1996 , Büring 2003 . The present paper explores another way in which intonation contributes to conveyed content. Sometimes in a discourse or dialogue a single locutionary act cor-responds to two (or more) illocutionary acts. Furthermore, these illocutionary acts are ordinarily conveyed by utterances with incompatible semantic types (Asher and Lascarides 2001) . We refer to such locutions as complex speech acts. Indirect requests, as in (2a), are a prime example (Searle 1975) . (2) a. Could you please pass the salt? b. Do you (#please) speak Arabic?
(2a) is syntactically an interrogative, and therefore -by the conventional association of clause type and discourse function -asks a question. However, the adverb please in (2a), which marks polite requests, does not normally occur in neutral questions, as shown by (2b). Indirect requests are not the only kind of complex speech act. In this paper, we discuss a range of interrogative sentences which we argue function as both questions and assertions, and in which prosody -intonational phrasing, intonation, stress -often has important interpretive effects. We refer to these constructions as biased questions, as they convey an expectation, or bias, on the part of the speaker toward a specific answer to the question. We show in §4 that biased questions convey an assertion.
Examples of the types of interrogatives that we investigate are provided in (3) -(5). Tag questions, as in (3), provide a natural starting point, as they wear their illocutionary force(s) on their sleeves, so to speak.
(3) a. Jane isn't coming, is she? b. Jane is coming, isn't she?
As a matter of clausal syntax, tag questions possess both declarative and interrogative components. It is not unexpected, then, that they have properties of both assertions and questions. However, a number of more nuanced issues arise regarding their interpretation. First, tag questions are not always biased. Second, the discourse function of the interrogative component is influenced by the final pitch movement over the tag. Negative polar questions as in (4) are also biased toward a specific answer (Ladd 1981 , van Rooy andŠafářová 2003 , Romero and Han 2004 , Reese 2006a . (4) a. Isn't Jane coming too? b. Isn't Jane coming either?
We argue below that on the so-called "outside-negation" reading in (4a) (cf. Ladd 1981) negative polar questions do consist, at least in part, of an assertion. We link the biased reading of negative polar questions to the neutral reading of tag questions and discuss the weaker form of bias present on the so-called "inside-negation" reading, (4b). Finally, the examples in (5) each convey a bias toward a negative answer. Since Borkin (1971) , negative bias has been linked to the presence of a strong negative polarity item (NPI) (cf. Ladusaw 1979 , Krifka 1995 , van Rooy 2003 , Guerzoni 2004 . (5) a. Did John lift a finger to help Mary? b. Is John EVER going to help Mary? c. Did I TELL you writing a dissertation would be easy?
But it also occurs when a weak NPI like any or ever is pronounced with emphatic stress, as in (5b), and in certain examples of narrow focus, as in (5c) from Sadock (1971) . As far as we know, the examples in (5) have not received a unified account (see Asher and Reese (2005) for a recent attempt). It seems to us that such an account is desirable and we attempt to provide one here. In broad terms, our account of bias is couched in a theory of the alignment of linguistic form and illocutionary force. That is, our account of biased questions is framed within a linguistic theory of speech acts, as supplied by SDRT. Many aspects of linguistic form contribute to the determination of discourse function, including:
• clausal syntax and semantics,
• specific lexical choices,
• phonology
We are interested, in particular, in how phonology interacts with lexical and compositional semantics to influence the rhetorical role an utterance plays in a discourse or dialogue. Aspects of phonology relevant to interpretation include final tune and nuclear pitch accent (or focus). The former is normally taken to signal some relation between the speaker, the underlying propositional content of an utterance and the common ground or the public commitments of various discourse participants (Gussenhoven 1984 , Steedman 2000 , Gunlogson 2003 , Marandin et al. 2005 . The latter contributes information structural information, for example by marking information as given or new, in addition to introducing a set of alternative propositions.
We provide a formal model of complex speech acts using an extension of type theory proposed in Asher and Pustejovsky (2004) and a theory of discourse interpretation, viz. SDRT. SDRT distinguishes many relational types of speech act (like answers) and provides a good framework for analyzing complex speech acts. We provide an analysis of the constructions in (3) -(5), focusing on the interaction of intonation, prosody and syntax, in the promotion of bias and the computation of the rhetorical role of complex speech acts.
Kinds of Biased Questions
The present section offers more detail on the constructions introduced in §1.
Tag Questions
Although English tag questions have received a lot of attention in descriptive grammars of English (Quirk et al. 1985, Huddleston and Pullum 2002) and from syntacticians (Culicover 1992) , there has been relatively little formal semantic and pragmatic work, and certainly little or no recent work. 1 Nevertheless, tag questions provide an interesting case in which intonation contributes to what is said.
Syntactically, tag questions consist of a declarative clause paratactically related to a reduced interrogative clause, or tag, as in (3) from §1. While these surface syntactic features certainly contribute to the presence of both an assertion and a question in discourse logical form, (i) they do not guarantee it, and (ii) they do not provide any information about the specific rhetorical contribution of the tag. 2 We maintain that certain lexical and phonological cues provide information for the computation of more fine-grained discourse functions.
We assume the description of intonational tunes provided by the To(nes) and B(reak) I(ndices) labelling conventions (Beckman and Elam 1997) . In the ToBI framework, an intonational tune is a string of tones constructed on the basis of a simple generative grammar. An intonational phrase -the largest prosodic unit in ToBI -consists of one or more intermediate phrases followed by a boundary tone, L% or H%, and an intermediate phrase consists of one or more pitch accents followed by a phrase accent L-or H-. The ToBI annotation scheme as described in Beckman and Elam (1997) assumes five pitch accents: L*, H*, L+H*, L*+H, H*+!H. Pitch accents are aligned with stressed syllables.
With this background in mind, there are two phonological distinctions relevant to understanding the meaning and use of tag questions. First, the sequence of phrase accent and boundary tone, i.e. final falling vs. final rising intonation, on the tag is often claimed to have interpretive effects (cf. Rando 1980 , Quirk et al. 1985 , Huddleston and Pullum 2002 . 3 Most, if not all, descriptions of tag questions note this fact and associate some interpretation with the fall vs. rise distinction. Descriptions of these interpretations are remarkably consistent between researchers and we have no reason to dispute them here. Tag questions with falling intonation ask for acknowledgment from the addressee that the communicative goal of the anchor has been achieved, cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002) for example. In the case of declarative anchors this speech-act related goal, or SARG, is simply belief transfer, i.e. that the addressee come to believe the truth of the anchor.
The simple constructed dialogue in (6) provides an illustration. Imagine that A and B are trying to complete some task at which neither is proficient, but at which Julie is known to be. 4 (6) a. A: Julie wouldn't do it that way. b. B: Well, Julie isn't here, / is she.
B's utterance (6b) does not express any doubt regarding the truth of the anchor, but rather is used to get A to acknowledge that Julie is not present (and therefore that how Julie would accomplish the task is irrelevant to the present situation). As described above, this use of a tag question stands in a close correspondence to the SDRT relation Acknowledgment, which holds when an utterance entails that the communicative goal of the utterance to which it is attached has been achieved. When the utterance is a question, we use the relation Acknowledgment q instead. 5 Tag questions with final rising intonation are still biased toward an answer that confirms the content of the anchor, yet express some uncertainty or doubt on the part of the speaker. The dialogue in (7) illustrates. B's turn in (7b) conveys a belief that Julie is not present (and thus answers A's question). The tag itself, however, expresses doubt or uncertainty, i.e. the speaker is open to the possibility that he is wrong. On this use the tag acts as a request for confirmation of the anchor. If the addressee has evidence to the contrary, he should provide it; if not, then he should acknowledge the truth of the anchor. We capture 3 It is an empirical question how best to characterize the fall vs. rise distinction. For example, Gunlogson (2003) distinguishes between falling vs. non-falling. As a result, she includes final plateaus, i.e. H-L% sequences, with rises. We ignore these issues here and follow Gunlogson in drawing the line between falling and non-falling tunes. 4 In examples, we adopt the orthographic convention of indicating a final fall with a period, and a final rise with a question mark.
5 For any discourse relation R, Rq relates α and β just in case any answer γ to β entails that R(α, γ).
this reading via the SDRT relation Confirmation q .
Both of these interpretations are biased, in that the anchor is asserted (see the forthcoming discussion in §4). This fact blocks the default intention associated with the interrogative component of the utterance, viz. to know an answer. But tag questions can function as neutral requests for information, as shown in (8). (8) a. A: We need to find somebody who has done this before. b. B: Julie isn't here = is she?
Several aspects of linguistic form appear to be necessary for a neutral reading to arise. First, the neutral reading is only possible when the anchor contains a negation and when there is little or no rhythmic break between the anchor and the tag (Ladd 1981 , McCawley 1988 , Huddleston and Pullum 2002 . Moreover, the anchor of a neutral tag question is more likely to contain a H-phrase accent. Ladd (1981) refers to the tag questions in (6b) and (7b) as nuclear tag questions, indicated by placing a slash between the anchor and the tag, and to the neutral reading in (8) as a postnuclear tag question, indicated with an equals sign. Ladd's description of postnuclear tag questions corresponds in the ToBI scheme to an utterance consisting of a single intonational phrase, which itself consists of a single intermediate phrase (and a boundary tone). The nuclear pitch accent, i.e. the last pitch accent in the intermediate phrase occurs somewhere in the anchor. On this view, there is no pitch accent on any element of the tag itself. Nuclear tag questions then might consist of either two complete intonational phrases, or one, which itself contains two intermediate phrases. We find this description of postnuclear tags dubious. It is difficult in our experience not to hear a pitch accent on the auxiliary verb in the tag. Of course, one could posit the existence of postnuclear pitch accents (which is what Ladd appears to have in mind), but this is a controversial claim. We do, however, agree with Ladd and other authors, notably McCawley (1988) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) , that neutral readings of tag questions contain a weaker boundary between the anchor and tag than nuclear tag questions. For these reasons, we prefer to recast the nuclear/postnuclear distinction in terms of intonational phrasing as follows: nuclear tag questions consist of two complete intonational phrases, one for the anchor and one for the tag. Postnuclear tag questions consist of one intonational phrase that is constructed from two intermediate phrases for the anchor and tag. We sketch an analysis below in which these prosodic differences conspire with syntax and semantics to yield two speech acts or one. In either case, the computation of the discourse function of the tag relative to the anchor proceeds in much the same fashion. However, postnuclear prosody allows a neutral interpretation that nuclear prosody does not.
Negative Polar Questions
Standard semantic treatments of interrogative sentences predict positive and negative closed interrogatives like those in (9a) and (10a) to be equivalent. On these approaches questions partition the space of logical possibilities, each element of the partition being a proposition expressing a direct answer to the question (cf. Hamblin 1958 and more recently Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997) . At first glance, the prediction appears correct; the same propositions count as direct answers to both types of sentence, as shown by the simple yes and no answers to (9a) and (10a) below. But negative polar questions differ from positive polar questions in two important respects. First, negative questions convey a backgrounded attitude on the part of the speaker toward the proposition expressed by a positive answer (Ladd 1981 , Büring and Gunlogson 2000 , Han 2002 , van Rooy andŠafářová 2003 , Romero and Han 2004 , Reese 2006a ). (11b), for example, is a felicitous continuation of (11a), which conveys a stance of "epistemic neutrality" by the speaker regarding the issue raised by the question. (11c) is infelicitous in the same context, as it conveys a prior belief toward the issue raised by the question that conflicts with the neutrality expressed by (11a), namely that the president read (or ought to have read) the briefing. The second respect in which the two polar question types diverge is that negative questions are ambiguous in a way that positive questions are not (Ladd 1981 , Büring and Gunlogson 2000 , Huddleston and Pullum 2002 , Romero and Han 2004 . The two readings can be disambiguated by including a polarity item. Negative questions that contain a PPI, as in (12), are biased toward positive answers. Ladd (1981) dubs this interpretation the outside-negation reading. Negative questions that contain an NPI, as in (13), on the other hand, are biased toward negative answers, Ladd's inside-negation reading.
(12) a. Didn't Kim read the report too? b. Aren't there some vegetarian restaurants around here? (13) a. Didn't Kim read the report either? b. Aren't there any vegetarian restaurants around here?
We show in §4 that outside-negation negative questions like those in (12) involve an assertion and are consequently complex speech acts, whereas inside-negation negative questions as in (13) are not. We argue that outside-negation, like negation in the anchor of a neutral tag question, is metalinguistic.
Emphatic Focus Questions
Questions containing a strong NPI, such as those in (14), convey a bias toward a negative answer. Of the sentence types we consider in this paper, this one has received the most attention from formal semanticists (cf. Abels 2003 , Asher and Reese 2005 , Borkin 1971 , Guerzoni 2004 , Krifka 1995 , Ladusaw 1979 , van Rooy 2003 . Most of these analyses center around the semantic properties of polarity items, i.e. their lexical properties, in combination with certain well-attested pragmatic principles. Krifka (1995) is the ur-paper in this respect. van Rooy (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) , for example, (at least in outline) follow Krifka in their analyses. But there is an underlying respect in which these accounts are intonational. Krifka (1995) is explicit about this, noting that since NPIs introduce alternatives over the denotation of the NPI, they resemble "items in focus". Krifka also notes that strong NPIs necessarily require "emphatic focus", which he associates with an emphatic assertion operator that mirrors the semantic effects of even, and whose meaning others, notably van Rooy (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) , assume is shared (in part) by NPIs. This raises the question of whether it is the semantics of strong NPIs which is directly responsible for bias, or whether certain intonational facts are primarily responsible. The examples in (14), which we used to introduce the phenomena of negative bias, all contain strong NPIs. Consequently, the presence of such lexical items appears to be a sufficient condition for bias to exist.
But, we argue, it is not a necessary condition. Questions with domain wideners such as any and ever are neutral, unless read with the same emphatic stress as the minimizers in (14), as demonstrated by the minimal pair in (15a) and (15b) and the similar pair in (16). The existence minimal pairs like (15a) and (15b) suggests that intonation plays some role in the derivation of bias. (18) Did I TELL you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy? (17) and (18) establish that the presence of a strong NPI is not a necessary condition for negative bias. The foregoing discussion, we believe, establishes that intonation is the prime mover in deriving the bias present in (14) - (18). While it is tempting to adopt Krifka's analysis in terms of emphatic assertion, we note that it is insufficient, as it does not establish the existence of an assertion, which we argue is necessary given the evidence in §4.
Previous Approaches: Bias as Implicature
Previous treatments of bias treat it as a (generalized) conversational implicature. Krifka (1995 ), van Rooy (2003 and Guerzoni (2004) provide accounts of the negative bias of questions with a strong negative polarity item, and van Rooy anď Safářová (2003) and Romero and Han (2004) provide accounts of negative polar questions. What these approaches have in common is the assumption that bias is a calculable inference based on semantic content and pragmatic principles relating to rational and cooperative behavior. While some authors, notably Guerzoni (2004) and Romero and Han (2004) , posit hidden lexical content and syntactic ambiguities in order to jump start these calculations, they are no different in broad details to the other accounts mentioned above. 7 We begin our review of the literature with the account of questions with strong negative polarity items in Krifka (1995) and the extensions in van Rooy (2003) and Krifka (2003) . We suggest possible extensions of Krifka's analysis to cover what we have termed emphatic focus questions in general. We then address Romero and Han's 2004 analysis of negative polar questions and Ladd's ambiguity. Borkin (1971) inter alia notes that interrogative sentences that contain a strong negative polarity item are necessarily biased toward a proposition expressing a negative answer. For the most part, previous research has not been concerned with bias per se, but with why NPIs are licensed in questions in the first place. Krifka (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) are notable exceptions. Accounts of bias, however, are intimately tied to accounts of NPI licensing, so some discussion of the broad outline of these approaches is in order Krifka (1995) 's account of NPI licensing is based on the assumption that strong NPIs are associated with a set of alternative utterances -assertions or questions -and that these alternative utterances must be pragmatically motivated. Krifka (2003) invokes the principle motivated introduction of alternatives (MIA) to effect this pragmatic licensing.
Emphatic Focus Questions
• Motivated Introduction of Alternatives:
If U (. . . α . . .) is uttered, where α introduces an alternative set A, then for alternative utterances U (. . . α . . .), where α ∈ A, the speaker must have reason (i) to introduce these alternatives, and (ii) not to utter any alternative (Krifka 2003 ).
MIA applies not only to strong negative polarity items, but to any expression that is associated with an alternative set, i.e. any constituent that is "in focus" (Rooth 1985) .
Consider the infelicitous example in (19), which contains the strong NPI a drop, which -according to Krifka (1995) -denotes a minimal quantity of liquid, in addition to introducing a set of alternative quantities.
(19) #Larry drank a drop of whiskey.
According to MIA, the speaker must have a reason to introduce the alternative assertions associated introduced by (19). Generally, Krifka supposes, such reasons involve (i) the congruence of the alternative assertions with the current question under discussion (Roberts 1996) or (ii) the speaker's awareness of being able to make stronger or weaker claims. More importantly, MIA requires that the speaker has reasons not to assert any of the alternative assertions. If the alternative assertions are not ordered by entailment, the speaker might simply believe the alternatives to be false, or at the very least does not believe them to be true and is thus obeying Grice (1975) 's maxim of Quality. If all of the alternative propositions are (logically) weaker than the asserted proposition, an interlocutor can assume that they are not the strongest defendable claims consistent with the speaker's knowledge, and is therefore obeying Grice's maxim of Quantity by not asserting them. If the alternatives are (logically) stronger, an interpreter infers through standard scalar reasoning that the speaker believes that all of the alternative assertions are false.
The infelicity of a strong NPI in an upward monotone context is a consequence of the assumption that they denote minimal elements with respect to a scale, e.g. the minimal quantity of liquid as in (19). Therefore, an occurrence of a strong NPI in an upward monotone context results in a weaker assertion, than any of the alternatives. Because all of the alternative assertions are logically stronger than the actual assertion, it is implicated (via MIA) that the alternatives are false. However, the negation of any of the alternative assertions entails the negation of the actual assertion and we are caught in a contradiction. Example (19) is infelicitous on Krifka's analysis because the alternatives are not pragmatically licensed. Negation reverses the ordering. As a result, the actual assertion is logically stronger than any of the alternatives. The alternative assertions are not asserted, in this case, because they are not the strongest claim consistent with the speakers beliefs.
The negative bias of questions like (20), according to Krifka (1995 Krifka ( , 2003 , results from a negative implicature based on MIA. MIA requires of questions that the speaker have reasons (i) to introduce the alternative questions and (ii) not to ask any of these alternatives. As for the first requirement, Krifka argues that the speaker is aware that the alternative questions are potentially relevant, for example as questions under discussion or as sub-questions to some superordinate QUD (Roberts 1996 , Büring 2003 , or -in cases where the alternatives form a scalethat he is aware of being able to ask more or less inquisitive questions. According to Krifka, there are two reasons a speaker might choose not to ask any of the invoked alternative questions. Following Borkin (1971) , the speaker might believe that the answers to the alternative questions are already known. If the actual question is not settled, then the presumed answers to the alternative questions must all be negative, as a positive answer to any alternative entails a positive answer to the actual question, contradicting the assumption that the actual question was not settled. (20) therefore presupposes that Larry did not drink any substantial amount of whiskey, and asks whether he drank even the minimal amount.
More generally, Krifka (2003) suggests that the speaker might assign very low, non-zero, probabilities to the propositions Larry drank quantity α of whiskey, for alternative quantities α ∈ A. In this case, the speaker is so certain that the answer to her question is negative, that she deliberately asks a "risky" question, that is, one that has a greater a priori likelihood of a positive answer. Krifka (2003) , following van Rooy (2003), gives an information theoretic formulation of this analysis. van Rooy (2003) argues that speakers strive for a kind of equilibrium in the questions they ask. Specifically, they formulate questions in such a way that each answer yields roughly the same amount of information. 8 Put in other words, a question should be formulated in a way that maximizes the average informativity of its answer. This measure is the familiar information theoretic notion of entropy. The information value of a proposition q is defined, following Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) :
inf(q) = − log 2 (P (q)) inf(q) = 0 when P (q) = 1, the intuition being that learning that q in this circumstance provides no new information. The entropy E of a question Q is the weighted average of the informativity of its answers:
is maximized when each answer in Q is equally likely. Returning to (20), the speaker asks the actual question rather than any of the alternative questions because the entropy of the actual question is greater than the entropy of the alternatives:
This inequality holds just in case the likelihood of a positive answer to any of the invoked alternatives is less than the likelihood of the negative answer. That is, for any substantial amount of whiskey α, the speaker considers it less likely that Larry drank quantity α of whiskey, than that he did not drink that amount. Asking the "extreme" question with the minimizer increases the entropy of the question, because the probability that Larry drank the minimal amount of whiskey is greater than the probability that he drank any substantial amount. 9 Asking the question with the minimizer reduces bias by adding probability to the positive answer, but at the same time shows that the speaker considers it unlikely that Larry drank any substantial amount.
This analysis might apply to other kinds of emphatic focus questions, though Krifka 1995 Krifka , 2003 does not address these cases directly. Consider, for example, (17b), repeated below in (21). This question, like questions with strong NPIs, is biased toward a negative answer.
(21) Do you NEED that porkchop?
However, it is hard to see at first glance how this type of question is amenable to the analysis described above. In particular, note that the alternative set associated with the focused verb, e.g.,want, yearn for,..., do not form a scale with the item in focus. That x needs y does not entail that x wants y and vice versa. So the speaker may simply choose not to ask any of the alternative questions because she believes them to be settled. However there is no way to decide based on this information which way the alternatives are settled, i.e. in favor of the positive or negative answer. A possible solution to this puzzle hinges on the observation that the pitch accent on need in (21) is not a simple focus marker, e.g. an H* tone. To our ear, (21) is most naturally read with an L*+H accent. Krifka (1995) argues that stressed versions of any and ever, which also yield a negative bias when they appear in questions, are emphatically focused. He goes on to define a pragmatic notion of emphatic assertion, whose effect mirrors that of the focus sensitive adverb even. That is, if an assertion has an emphatic focus, then any alternative assertion is considered to be more likely in the discourse context than the actual assertion. 10 In (22), for example, the actual assertion -that John would distrust Mother Theresais less likely than the proposition that John would distrust any other person. (22) John would distrust MOTHER THERESA.
The main effect of the emphatic assertion operator is to induce a partial order over the alternative assertions based on their relative likelihood. It also contributes the information that the actual assertion is more informative than any of the alternatives. 11 So given the emphatic focus in (21), it follows that the entropy of the actual question is greater than the entropy of any of the alternatives, as in questions with a strong NPI. The speaker is in effect conceding that the person reaching for the pork chop may want it, yearn for, etc., but (probably) does not need it.
The most important aspect of the analysis described above is that the bias is a conversational implicature. It follows from the meaning of the questions and the pragmatic constraint MIA. Furthermore, it is a rather weak bias. In effect, the bias states that all of the invoked alternatives are settled in a particular way and leaves the actual question open.x 3.2 Negative Polar Questions Romero and Han (2004) provide an analysis of negative polar interrogatives that attempts to account for (i) the backgrounded speaker attitude associated with their use and (ii) the "outside-negation/inside-negation" ambiguity. Their analysis is based on an observation that negative polar questions and questions containing the epistemic adverb really exhibit similar biases. Based on this similarity, they suggest that really and preposed negated auxiliaries introduce an operator VERUM into the logical form of sentences. VERUM is defined in (23). Epi x (w) is the set of worlds accessible from w and compatible with x's knowledge in w. Conv x (w ) is the set of worlds where the conversational goals of x in w are met. Finally, CG w is the set of propositions representing the shared beliefs of the discourse participants in w , i.e. the common ground.
VERUM says of a proposition φ that some agent x is certain that in all of the worlds in which the conversational goals of x are met, φ is part of the common ground, which Romero and Han gloss as FOR-SURE-CG x φ.
that the actual assertion is less likely than the conjunction of all of the alternative assertions. 11 Recall that inf(q) > inf(q ) iff P (q) < P (q ).
According to (23), VERUM is an epistemic modal operator that embeds a "metaconversational" modal statement, i.e., a modal statement that refers to the conversation goals of the discourse participants rather than to the state of the world. The use of meta-conversational moves, or speech acts, is governed by the following maxim.
• Principle of Economy:
Do not use a meta-conversational move unless necessary (to resolve epistemic conflicts or to ensure Quality) (Romero and Han 2004, p. 629 ).
Romero and Han derive the backgrounded speaker attitude associated with negative questions, which they treat as a conversational implicature, via (23). Negative questions are for them meta-conversational moves by definition, since VERUM embeds the modal operator Conv x . Assuming that discourse participants are cooperative and obey (23), then, it follows either that the speaker holds some belief φ which is inconsistent with the addressee's beliefs or believes φ but lacks sufficient evidence to assert it, i.e., the speaker wishes to avoid a violation of Quality. The outside-negation/inside-negation ambiguity on the VERUM account reduces to a simple scope ambiguity, keeping with Ladd (1981)'s original intuition. The outside-negation reading results when negation out scopes VERUM and the insidenegation reading results when VERUM out scopes negation. The logical form and denotation of the outside-and inside-negation readings of the negative polar question in (10) are provided in (24) and (25) respectively.
Outside-negation polar questions on Romero and Han's analysis ask the addressee whether or not he is certain that φ should be added to the common ground, where φ is the descriptive content of the question. Inside-negation polar questions make the same inquiry about ¬φ.
There are a number of problems with Romero and Han (2004) 's analysis. First, Romero and Han note that negative questions often challenge some aspect of a previous utterance and build this discourse function into the denotation of the question via (23). We have two concerns with this approach: (i) conversational goals do not appear to be the right level of description and (ii) one cannot rely on epistemic conflict or uncertainty to derive the bias. Both points are illustrated by (26) . (26) a. A: Some of the regents support a tuition increase. b. B: Don't all of them support an increase?
There is an implicature associated with (26a) that not all of the regents support a tuition increase, which (26b) intuitively challenges. But it seems incorrect to say that A has as a conversational goal that this implicature be added to the common ground; implicatures are pragmatic enrichments of utterances made by addressees, not the speaker. Furthermore, the assertion in (26a) is not epistemically inconsistent with either answer to (26b), short-circuiting any attempt to compute a conversational implicature corresponding to the bias inherent in (26b) by saying that some epistemic conflict exists. Furthermore, the bias inherent to negative questions, or more properly the backgrounded speaker attitude, is not necessarily epistemic, as Romero and Han (2004) assume. Consider the examples in (27) (Huddleston and Pullum 2002) . (27) a. Aren't you ashamed of yourselves? b. Don't you like it?
(27a) and (27b) convey deontic and desiderative biases respectively Huddleston and Pullum (2002) . There are also issues associated with the scopal account of the outside-/insidenegation readings. It is a standard assumption in the literature at this point that questions denote the set of propositions that count as direct answers Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) . The most direct answer to a polar question are expressed with the answer particles yes and no. Intuitively, a simple yes response to (10) from §[...] on an outside-negation reading conveys the proposition that Jane is coming, not the weaker one predicted by Romero and Han (2004) that FOR-SURE-CG x Jane is coming. Likewise, no means that Jane is not coming, not the weaker statement that ¬FOR-SURE-CG x Jane is coming.
The denotation of inside-negation polar question given in (25b) is even more problematic. A simple positive answer to (10) on the inside-negation reading is most naturally understood as expressing the proposition that Jane is coming, not FOR-SURE-CG x ¬ Jane is coming, which would seem to express just the opposite. And again, a negative answer intuitively means that Jane is not coming, not ¬FOR-SURE-CG x ¬ Jane is coming, which is more congruent with the proposition that Jane is coming. As we already suggested, it would seem that the positive question (9) and (10) are equivalent and that the denotation in (24b) and (25b) do not accurately reflect the denotation of (10).
A Preview of the Current Proposal
Both Krifka (1995) (and later van Rooy 2003) and Romero and Han (2004) analyze the bias inherent to these types of question as implicatures. Specifically, it follows from the meaning of the question in conjunction with the assumption that the speaker is obeying certain principles of rational and cooperative behavior. If bias is indeed an implicature, one would expect it to be cancellable. After all, cancellability is the hallmark of implicatures. However, there is reason to doubt these approaches precisely because bias does not appear to be cancellable. Consider (28) (which is a variant (11) adopted from Gunlogson (2003)), which would be a very odd sequence of utterances in a context that presupposes neutrality, e.g. at a hearing. (28) a. I have no beliefs on the matter. I just want to know. . . b. #Aren't you a member of the Communist Party?
If the bias in (28b) were truly a conversational implicature, then there is no reason that it should not simply be cancelled in the context above. The situation is even worse. Consider (29). The context favors a neutral question reading: A and B are interested to know which individuals in a given domain satisfy a certain property, viz. the property of being a teetotaler. Again, negative questions with a preposed, negated auxiliary verb are ruled out in a neutral context. One simply cannot use such a question as a neutral request for information. Furthermore, the second member of each pair, which is also a negative question, can be used in this context. (9) and (10) provide evidence that these two kinds of questions are semantically equivalent. (Romero and Han (2004) , of course, do not maintain this equivalence, as described above.) But the inference leading to an implicature is supposed to be based on meaning, rather than form, i.e. it is non-detachable (Levinson 1983 ). It is mysterious, then, why one is necessarily biased and the other is not.
Admittedly, the constraints on the use of NPIs imposed by their meaning and MIA plausibly make their implicature more difficult to cancel. One might assume, even, that these questions presuppose that every alternative answer is settled in favor of the negative answer (van Rooy 2003). However, these questions are felicitous in contexts where it is clearly the case that this presupposition does not hold, and where the speaker can not simply assume that it will be accommodated. Consider (30) from Asher and Reese (2005) . Clearly A does not presuppose that John does not do any substantial amount of housework given (30a). We argue in §4 that bias essentially involves a speaker commitment, which we characterize as an assertion. This explains the non-cancellability facts above. Romero (2005) moves toward this position when she suggests that the bias of negative questions is a conventional implicature (see Kratzer 1999 and Potts 2005) , which also involves a commitment by the speaker. 12 We prefer to treat bias as a type of indirectness, and model the semantics of tag questions, negative polar questions and emphatic focus questions using complex speech act types. First, we provide more evidence for the dual nature of biased questions, showing that they have distributional properties of both questions and assertions. Sadock (1971 Sadock ( , 1974 introduces several tests for illocutionary force that appeal to the co-occurrence restrictions between specific discourse markers and utterances used as assertions and questions. The sentence initial parentheticals after all and yet co-occur with assertions, for example, but neutral questions. After all, for example, can be prefixed to an assertion, but not to a neutral question, as in (31a) and (31b) respectively.
Evidence for Multiple Speech Acts

(31)
It's fine if you don't finish the article today. a. After all, your adviser is out of the country. b. #After all, is your adviser out of the country?
Likewise, utterances prefixed with yet can follow an assertion, cf. (32b), but not a neutral question, as in (33b).
a. John is always late for work.
b. Yet, he continues to be promoted.
(33) a. Is John always late for work? b. #Yet, he continues to be promoted.
There are parallel tests for questions. Sadock (1971 Sadock ( , 1974 notes that sentenceinitial tell me and the expression by any chance occur with questions, but not assertions, as established in (34) Furthermore, we argue that tell me and by any chance also distinguish between distinct sub-types of question. Tell me -as a simple request for a response from the addressee -selects for any type of question. By any chance, on the other hand, as an expression of epistemic uncertainty, only selects neutral questions. As such, it does not appear with biased questions, which we believe convey a commitment by the speaker.
In the following subsection, we apply these tests to the kinds of constructions discussed in the previous section, showing that they are indeed complex speech acts consisting of both a question and an assertion.
Tag Questions
Nuclear Tag Questions.
Unsurprisingly, nuclear tag questions involve both an assertion and a question according to Sadock's diagnostics. (36) and (37) establish that nuclear tag questions do assert the anchor according to the after all test. The examples in (38a) and (38b), on the other hand, show that nuclear tag questions are not neutral questions, as they do not pass the by any chance test, but that they are questions, as they do pass the tell me test (38) a. Tell me, Jane {is/isn't} coming / {isn't/is} she. b. #Jane {is/isn't} coming, by any chance / {isn't/is} she.
Postnuclear Tag Questions.
Postnuclear tag questions exhibit more variation in discourse function than nuclear tag questions. The polarity of the anchor appears to affect the available interpretations. Tag questions with positive anchors behave much like nuclear tag questions: they are assertions, as shown by (39) and (40), and (tell me) questions, (41). They are not neutral questions, however, as demonstrated by (42).
(39) a. A: Why is Nicholas so sure the conference will be dull? b. A: After all, Julie is coming=isn't she?
(40) a. A: Pascal's not coming, so why is Nicholas so sure the conference will be a success? b. A: After all, Julie isn't coming {#too/either}=is she? (41) Tell me, Jane {is/isn't} coming={isn't/is} she?
The inclusion of a positive polarity item in a postnuclear tag question with a negative anchor coerces a neutral question reading for examples such as (43). The anchor is no longer asserted under these circumstances, as established by (40b).
(42) #Jane is coming, by any chance=isn't she? (43) Jane isn't coming {too/#either},by any chance=is she?
The disambiguating role of the PPI is an important clue to understanding how this neutral reading arises. We believe that the negation in these examples scopes over the speech act itself, i.e., that it is a metalinguistic operator. Metalinguistic negation, as has been noted by Horn (1989) , neither licenses NPIs, nor anti-licenses PPIs.
Negative Polar Questions
According to Sadock's diagnostics, outside-negation NIs are assertions, while insidenegation NIs are not. Note that (44b) can be preceded by after all when it contains the PPI too, but not when it contains the NPI either. Either version of (44b) Again, if yet is left off of (45b), then either the outside-or inside-negation reading of (45a) is available. Because outside-negation negative questions pass the after all and yet tests, we maintain that they characteristically make assertions. This is not true of inside-negation questions. Outside-and inside-negation negative questions, however, are still questions: they can be answered with yes or no and they co-occur with the discourse marker tell me.
(46)
Tell me, isn't Jane coming {too/either}?
Outside-negation negative questions, consequently, are both questions and assertions, as demonstrated by the discourse in (47). The tell me prefixed to the utterance in (47a) requires it to be a question. At the same time, the yet prefixed to (47b) requires (47a) to be an assertion. As a result, in order for the the typing constraints of tell me and yet to be satisfied in (47), the negative interrogative in (47a) must be simultaneously typed as an assertion and question. In other words, the type associated with (47a) is complex semantic type (Asher and Pustejovsky 2004) .
Emphatic Focus Questions
Finally, applying the tests to the type of interrogative sentences exemplified in (5) shows that they too are complex speech acts, as shown in (48) - (51) Again, it is not the case that the illocutionary force of these questions is ambiguous or underdertermined. Rather, it is overdetermined. Biased questions are simultaneously assertions and questions as shown by (53). (53) After all, has John by any chance EVER voted for a democrat?
Assuming that the arguments to after all and by any chance must be restricted to assertions and questions respectively, then both types must be available in the discourse context, otherwise a type clash should arise in (53), resulting in a kind of zeugmatic effect.
Towards an Analysis of Bias
The present section provides an outline of an analysis of bias within Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT: Asher and Lascarides 2003). 13
The Basics of SDRT
SDRT is a dynamic semantic theory of the interpretation of discourse and dialogue that takes the rhetorical connections between utterances seriously. A segmented discourse representation structure, or SDRS, is a triple A, F, LAST , where:
• A is a set of labels.
• LAST is a label in A (intuitively, this is the label of the content of the last clause that was added to the logical form); and
• F is a function which assigns each member of A a formula of the SDRS language, which includes formulas of some version of dynamic semantics (DRT, DPL, Update Semantics, Martin Löf Type Theory, among others.)
This notion of discourse structure is very abstract and so very general.
To give a feel for the structures posited by SDRT and for its semantic implications about conveyed content, let's look to the temporal consequences of a text. the temporal structure of a discourse is more elaborate than what is suggested by the formal semantic analysis of tenses. There are clearly temporal shifts that show that the treatment of tenses cannot simply rely on the superficial order of the sentences in the text. (54c) -(54d) provide 'more detail' about the event in (54b), which itself elaborates on (54a). (54e) continues the elaboration of John's evening that (54b) started, forming a narrative with it (temporal progression). Clearly, the ordering of events does not follow the order of presentation, but rather obeys constraints imposed by discourse structure. Thus the eventualities that are understood as elaborating on others are temporally subordinate to them, and those events that represent narrative continuity are understood as following each other. SDRT (Asher 1993, Asher and Lascarides 2003) provides the following discourse structure for (54) and permits a proper treatment of the temporal progression of the text. Here π 6 and π 7 are discourse constituents created by the process of inferring the discourse structure. See Asher and Lascarides (2003) for details. The discourse structure A, F, LAST for (54) is as follows:
SDRT contains a logical system for computing discourse structure on the basis of information available from syntax and compositional and lexical semantics. Our work over the past several years has been to see how intonation and prosody can be added as information sources to this system. There are two parts to this logical system-the first is a glue logic that contains axioms for inferring discourse relations between discourse constituents. In view of the fact that each discourse constituent has a unique label, the axioms exploit information about labels that is given by a description of the SDRS assembled in the discourse thus far and of the new discourse constituent β to be linked to some available discourse constituent α in the SDRS. These descriptions specify discourse structures by saying which constituents are related to which other constituents and by saying in which constituent that information is to be found. Thus, a binary discourse relation like Acknowledgement that holds between two discourse constituents in an SDRS will be expressed in the description language as a three place predicate symbol Acknowledgement(α, β, λ), which means that the constituent labelled by β serves as an acknowledgement to β and that this information is contained within the formula associated with label λ.
The axioms and rules of the glue logic exploit standard propositional logic connectives and a weak conditional operator >, which serves to represent defeasible rules about discourse structure. The general form of a defeasible rule about discourse structure is provided below.
In words this rule says that if β is to be attached somehow to α in λ and certain information about α, β and the whole discourse structure is available, then normally β is to be attached with R to α in λ. Such normality conditionals support modus ponens defeasibly. Thus, when the left hand side formula holds, we can defeasibly infer R(α, β, λ). Asher and Lascarides (2003) give a complete specification of the glue logic, in particular the defeasible consequence relation | ∼. In addition, to compute relations in dialogue SDRT makes use of an extension of the glue logic to reason about discourse participants' cognitive states. This logic is called the logic of cognitive modelling. This extension contains not only predicates relevant to computing discourse structure, propositional connectives and the weak conditional operator >, but also modal operators for belief and intention. We will express the contributions of prosody to computing discourse relations in the various types of biased questions we've described above using both the glue logic and the logic of cognitive modelling.
Complex Speech Acts
In §4, we showed that tag questions, outside-negation polar questions, and emphatic focus questions involve not only a question, but an assertive component as well. What we argue in the present section is that biased questions are, in fact, assigned a complex speech act type by the grammar. Following Asher and Lascarides (2001), we model complex types using the notion of a dot type in the sense of (Asher and Pustejovsky 2004 ). An utterance is a conventionalized complex speech act (CSA) if, (a) the grammar assigns it a complex speech act type of the form s 1 •s 2 , such that s 1 and s 2 are distinct (incompatible) types of semantic objects; and (b) Gricean-style principles of rationality and cooperativity link the constituent type s 1 to the type s 2 (Asher and Lascarides 2003, p. 310) . §4 provided the linguistic evidence that biased questions are assigned a complex speech act type, with a question component and an assertion component. Moreover, these component types are associated with distinct, incompatible semantic objects. The selectional constraints of the discourse markers mentioned above provide evidence of this. In addition, most compositional semantic theories assign the content of assertions and questions distinct, incompatible types of modeltheoretic objects (or context-change potentials in a dynamic setting). Assertions, for example, are associated with propositions, or sets of possible worlds, whereas questions are associated with sets of propositions (Hamblin 1973) or propositional concepts (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984) . According to clause (a) in the above quotation, then, biased questions are conventionally assigned a complex speech act type assertion • question. 14 The grammar is able to exploit both of the constituent types of a complex type in computing the rhetorical contribution of an utterance in a given discourse context through a rule of Dot Exploitation. If an utterance β attaches to an utterance α (with some undetermined rhetorical relation) in the discourse context λ -written ?(α, β, λ) -and β is assigned a complex type t 1 • t 2 by the grammar, then new speech act discourse referents γ 1 and γ 2 of type t 1 and t 2 respectively are introduced. These new discourse referents are related to the original speech act referent β by a relation O-Elab, or "dot elaboration".
Clause (b) of the definition of conventionalized complex speech acts requires that Gricean-style reasoning about rationality and cooperativity link the constituent types of the complex type. We provide an informal discussion of this reasoning in the subsections below. The requirement is formalized in the coherence constraint on complex types given below (Asher and Lascarides 2001) . C encodes the linguistic competence of the discourse participants. As such, it contains conventionalized information about the mapping of linguistic form to compositional and lexical semantics, in addition to the SDRT rules for inferring rhetorical connections between utterances. R contains axioms for reasoning about the cognitive states, i.e. the beliefs, intentions and goals, of the discourse participants, and information from world knowledge.
• Coherence Constraint on Complex Speech Act Types:
Suppose that:
Then:
where λ labels an SDRS that results from attaching γ 1 to α in the SDRS labeled by λ.
The coherence constraint ensures that the constituent types of a complex speech act are related by a discourse relation R, inferred on the basis of conventionalized linguistic knowledge and Gricean-style reasoning about rationality and cooperativity formalized in R. Before addressing how the constituent types of the biased question that form the topic of this paper are rhetorically linked, a few more words need to be said about the content of C, R, and what it means for an utterance α to have the type assertion in SDRT. To reiterate what was said above, C represents the linguistic competence of the discourse participants; it therefore provides information about syntax, phonology, and lexical and compositional semantics, in addition to information about the semantic contribution of rhetorical relations and SDRT's axioms for inferring rhetorical connections between utterances. As such, C includes the information that the negation in neutral tag questions and outside-negation polar questions is metalinguistic (however the notion of "metalinguistic" is cashed out formally). It also contains information about the intonational tune of an utterance and its interpretation. The direction of the f 0 trend at the end of intonational phrases, for example, is often assumed to convey information about the speaker's relation to a proposition and its relation to the common ground (Gussenhoven 1984) . Along similar lines, the placement and choice of nuclear pitch accent provides similar information, for example by marking information as new or backgrounded (Steedman 2000) , and by introducing a (partially ordered) set of alternative propositions. Intonation thus provides the interpreter with a rich source of information for reasoning about the cognitive state of the speaker, or at least information about the speaker's "take" on the contents and structure of the discourse context.
This leads naturally into a discussion of the content of R, a set of axioms for reasoning about the cognitive states of discourse participants based on what has been said in the course of a discourse or dialogue and on who said it. There are, for example, axioms that model Gricean-style reasoning about the rationality and cooperativity of discourse participants, in addition to axioms that associate, by default, certain goals with utterances based on their linguistic form. We refer to these goals as speech act related goals, or SARGs. QRG, for example, states that the default SARG of a question is that the speaker believe an answer to it. Known Answers blocks this default inference when the speaker already believes an answer.
• QRG:
Finally, we formalize the notion of assertion in SDRT. Our characterization of assertions is not controversial, but is captured in a very specific way in a discoursebased frameworks like SDRT. Searle and Vanderveken (1985) provide the following description of assertions: "the speaker presents a proposition as representing an actual state of affairs in the world of utterance (p. 37)." In other words, the proposition conveyed by an assertion should be true. Based on these observations, we provide the definition of assertions in (55). (55) β : assertion just in case (i) (R(α, β, λ) and right-veridical (R) or (ii) β is the first constituent entered in the discourse structure 15 and |= l K β .
A right-veridical rhetorical relation is one that entails the content of its right argument:
The first clause of (55), then, simply requires that the speaker's utterance attach to the discourse context with a relation that entails it's content. The second clause is meant to cover cases in which the discourse segment is the first utterance in a discourse. It says that if the label for the discourse as a whole immediately outscopes β and entails (in the labelled language) the content K β of β, then β is an assertion.
Rhetorical relations like Narration, Explanation, and Correction are examples of right-veridical, and so on our definition are all kinds of assertions; relations such as Q-Elab or Narration q , on the other hand are not right-veridical. These and similar relations require their right-argument to be a question.
In the follow sections we discuss how the complex speech act types assigned to tag questions, outside-negation polar questions and emphatic focus questions satisfy the coherence constraint on complex types.
Tag Questions
Tag questions may or may not instantiate a complex speech act type. In the case of nuclear tag questions, we believe, clausal syntax and semantics, intonational phrasing, and the alignment rules of SDRT suggest the presence of two illocutionary acts: an assertion (based on the declarative anchor) and a question (derived from the tag). In the case of postnuclear tag questions, it is plausible to assume a complex type assertion • question. Recall that the discourse functions available to postnuclear tag questions are a super-set of those available to nuclear tag questions. Whereas, both types of tag question function as requests for acknowledgment or confirmation, postnuclear tag questions can also function as neutral questions. The neutral use of postnuclear tag questions, however, has peculiar lexical semantic properties, viz. the presence of a metalinguistic negation operator.
The reasoning that links the anchor and tag of a nuclear tag question mirrors exactly that which links the constituent types of a postnuclear tag question. We therefore focus on the latter below, since we are interested for the most part in the analysis of biased questions as complex speech act types. As an illustration, we focus on the interpretation of tag questions as requests for acknowledgement. This interpretation, recall, is associated with falling intonation over the tag, a phonological feature that we assume provides no essential semantic information (cf. Reese and Asher 2006 for more discussion).
The axiom schema in (56) provides (indirectly) the semantic content of the relation used to model acknowledgement questions. Acknowledgement q links α to β just in case the answer to β entails that the SARG of α has been accepted or achieved. This semantic information, we assume, is sufficient to infer thatinformation C.
(56)
Axiom on Acknowledgement Questions:
We sketch below how the coherence constraint on complex types is satisfied for postnuclear tag questions with falling intonation. Importantly, the rhetorical link between the constituent types follows from compositional semantics and cognitive modeling alone. Let β be a postnuclear tag question. Assume that R(α, β, λ) and that the grammar assigns β a complex type assertion • question. 16 Because ?(α, β, γ) assumes that β has a simple type, the rule Dot Exploitation is called, yielding:
where γ a : assertion gives the semantic contribution of the anchor and γ t : question gives the contribution of the tag. The coherence constraint on complex types, then, requires a rhetorical link between γ a and γ t . As we argued above, the requisite link is one of two relations: Acknowledgement q or Confirmation q . Because γ a is typed assertion, it must attach within λ with a right-veridical relation -see (55). Given this constraint, the SARG of γ a is that the addressee believe its propositional content. This means that in the schema in (56), φ is instantiated with B H(γa) (p γa ). It also follows from certain axioms of cognitive modeling that B S(γa) (p γa ) 17 and from the compositional semantics of questions and answers that Sanswer (γ t , p γa ). Finally, it is a theorem of the logic of cognitive modeling that B H(γa) (p γa ) > B H(γa) B H(γa) (p γa ), as belief is a K45 modality. As a result, in the absence of conflicting information the addressee infers thatNeutral readings of postnuclear tag questions, as already stated, have a peculiar lexical feature, viz. a metalinguistic negation operator in the anchor. As such, the computation of their discourse function is a separate matter from that of the postnuclear tag questions described above. We adopt the analysis of metalinguistic negation common to multi-valued logics (see for example Bochvar 1981 as discussed by Beaver and Krahmer 2001) in which ∼ K π is equivalent to ¬(π : assertion), at least with respect to declarative sentences. Given our characterization of assertion, this means that it is not the case that π attaches to the discourse context with a right-veridical relation. If π does not attach with a right-veridical relation, then must attach with a rhetorical relation pertinent to a neutral question. Note that in the cases discussed above, the association of the anchor with an assertion blocks the default SARG of a question: if the speaker (of a tag question) believes the content of the anchor -which follows from cognitive modeling and the fact that it is asserted -then Known Answer will fire with respect to the tag's SARG. However, if the anchor contains a metalinguistic negation operator, the interpreter can no longer infer that the speaker believes the content of the anchor and there is nothing blocking QRG.
A remaining issue involves the relationship between "postnuclear" intonational phrasing and neutral interpretations: why can't nuclear tag questions have a neutral interpretation? The answer, we maintain, lies in our assumption that nuclear phrasing forces two speech act discourse referents, one for the anchor and one for the tag. Postnuclear phrasing, on the other hand, assigns the tag question a dot type and Dot Exploitation will fire only if there is a type clash. This is normally the case, but metalinguistic negation -which forms part of the linguistic form of all neutral interpretations -cancels the assertion as described above.
Outside-Negation Polar Questions
Outside-negation polar questions, unlike their inside-negation counterparts, are also assigned a complex type assertion•question by the grammar. The connection between the constituent types varies according to the use to which the utterance is put. Outside-negation polar questions are felicitous in two types of situation, what Romero and Han (2004) call "contradiction" and "suggestion" scenarios. In the former situation, outside-negation polar questions are often prosodically marked in the same way as corrections, in which one finds some combination of higher mean pitch, greater pitch range, higher mean intensity and increased duration on the nuclear pitch accent (Swerts and Krahmer to appear) . (57) Reese (2006b) provides a number of examples which show that the discourse function of outside-negation negative polar interrogatives often patterns with the use of positive assertions as denials. This is to be expected on our analysis, since we maintain that outside-negation polar questions involve a positive assertion. In these cases, it is natural to assume that the assertion obtained through Dot Exploitation attaches the the preceding discourse context with a divergent rhetorical relation like Correction or Counterevidence. The presence of this the assertion requires, on pragmatic grounds, a reinterpretation of what question is being asked. A number of possibilities exist for attaching the question to the assertion. For example, the constituent speech acts may be related via Acknowledgement q or Confirmation q , as with tag questions. Another possibility is that a stronger relation like Counterevidence q holds, in which case the question functions as a challenge to the addressee to back up a previous commitment by supplying counterevidence to the speakers assertion (see Reese 2006a) .
Outside-negation polar questions also occur in neutral contexts, in which case they function as polite suggestions. (58), where (58b) serves as an answer to the question in (58a), illustrates this use. In this and similar cases, the component assertion, viz. that Thomas Pynchon wrote Gravity's Rainbow, attaches to the speech act discourse referent introduced by (58a) with QAP (Question-Answer Pair), a right-veridical relation. The question component of the complex speech act type again attaches to the answer with Acknowledgement q or Confirmation q depending on the certainty conveyed by B.
Emphatic Focus Questions
Our treatment of emphatic focus questions is similar to the treatment of outsidenegation polar questions above. One difference, however, is that emphatic focus questions involve a negative assertion instead of a positive one. As with the use of outside-negation questions in contradiction scenarios, the assertoric component of the complex type assigned to emphatic focus questions attaches to the prior discourse context with a divergent rhetorical relation, i.e. (59f) challenges A to either provide counterevidence to B's (negative) assertion (indirectly providing evidence for the original claim in (59a)) or to explain why she said it in the first place. These discourse functions are captured in SDRT with the relations Counterevidence q and Explanation * q respectively. The intonational properties of emphatic focus questions align with the characterization of their discourse function above. Emphatic focus, to our ears, is marked with an L*+H or L+H* nuclear pitch accent, often followed by a low-rising boundary -L*+H L-H% or L+H* L-H% in the ToBI annotation scheme. Liberman and Sag (1974) refer to this tune as the "contradiction contour" and Ward and Hirschberg (1985) argue that it conveys speaker incredulity, especially when occurring with marked spectral features. Along similar lines, Steedman (2000 Steedman ( , 2003 maintains that L*+H marks contested thematic constituents, making it a natural marker of corrections. Consider the emphatic focus question (60) -repeated from (21) -and its declarative cousin, which is a standard correction move, in which the speaker corrects the addressee's choice of words in the previous utterance. The same tune is operative in both (61b) and (60). In fact, we also believe that it plays a role in the interpretation of outside-negation polar interrogatives as well. Asher and Reese (2005) , following Ward and Hirschberg (1985) and Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) , said that this tune contributed the following meaning:
C is a set of alternative propositions which include the core proposition associated with the utterance and one other proposition just like the core proposition except that some other element of the appropriate type is substituted for the element in focus. We suppose this second proposition supplied by the nonlinguistic context or by discourse attachment. 18 For simple corrections, C consists of the discourse constituent to which the correcting constituent is attached-viz., in (61) it consists of the singleton { (61a) } and we derive the meaning of a Correction discourse relation (see Asher and Lascarides 2003) thus from the intonation alone. 19 In the case of the emphatic focus interrogative, the set C could consist of a proposition made salient by the non-linguistic situation that has a different element substituted for the accented element in the core proposition of the interrogative. The effect of the placement of the pitch accent singles out the element to which the speaker objects-that is, the proposition here would be something like: Addressee needs the porkchop he just grabbed. In other cases like (59), C picks up the topic of the exchanges in (59b)-(59e). Once again the focussed lexical element enables us to determine in part what that is--it's the proposition that: John does something around the house, and it is this topic that is corrected. As with other types of biased questions, this Correction based on intonation forces us to reinterpret the question, which by our tests is still conveyed by emphatic focus questions, along the lines we have already seen. Thus intonational information, in addition to the lexical semantic properties of strong negative polarity items, plays the central role in the grammaticization of emphatic focus questions as complex speech acts.
